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Teacher effort and teacher accountability: Some political economy determinants

by

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- Quality EFA requires physical inputs
- Quality EFA also requires intangible inputs
- One important one is teacher effort.

Literature on teacher effort

- Early concern about teacher effort
 - Weiner (1990), Drèze and Sen (1997) & PROBE (1999)
- More recently, studies attempt to measure teacher effort
 - Kremer et. al, 2005; MHRD, 2007; Sankar, 2007
 - Found teacher absence rate of 25%, modest time on task
- Studies on ways to improve teacher effort
 - through performance-related pay (Muralidharan/ Sundaraman, 2009; Duflo and Hanna, 2005) and
 - performance related promotion (Pritchett and Murgai, 2007).

Determinants of teacher effort

- Effort depends on school-governance environment
 - fair rewards and opportunities
 - incentives for effort – e.g. penalties for low effort
- Effort greater in environments where accountability measures
 - exist
 - implemented
- Teachers not only passive accepters of that environment
- Teachers may influence that environment
 - through their organizations
 - through their direct participation in politics

Aim

probe these wider factors that affect effort

- Look at role of T unions, T participation in politics, in UP
- First, consider teachers' participation in politics
- Second, examine the role of teacher unions
- Lastly explore implications for:
 - level at which accountability rests (how centralised)
 - implementability of accountability measures
 - teacher salary levels
 - teacher effort levels
 - student achievement

Data

- Little data to study these issues
- Survey of 570 teachers in 80 rural primary / 45 rural secondary schools, 5 districts of UP
- Data on
 - union membership & activities
 - participation in elections
 - political connections
 - private-tuition behavior
 - role in examinations and
 - participation in education-related litigation
- Methodology for collecting data
 - depersonalised Q
 - asking same Q in different ways

Other data

- Strength – at primary school level, we have data on :
 - teacher effort (presence rate, time on task)
 - Linked data on student achievement
- Also accessed other types of data
 - Data on legislators' occupations from secretariat library
 - Data on TU strikes and achievements is obtained from a variety of sources, e.g. newspaper reports / TU magazines
 - Also used published official documents such as :
 - report of National Commission on Teachers (NCT, 1986)
 - report of Central Advisory Board on Education (CABE, 1992).

Teachers' representation in upper house (Legislative Council) – UP bicameral

- Teachers have constitutionally guaranteed right to be represented in the upper house
- Article 171(3c) provides 1/12 of MLCs shall be elected by teachers of secondary schools & above
- Non-govt (mainly Aided) secondary school teachers enjoy privileged political position – have guaranteed representation
- Much debate in CA about this provision
- Strongly dissenting voices about singling out secondary school T, & concerns about potential politicisation of Ts.
- PSS demanding primary teachers be given privilege

The 'office of profit' provision

- Private aided school teachers can also enter Lower House
- Anomalous position of aided school teachers – developed over time
- No other govt. paid employees have this special right
- Govt. employees resent this privileged treatment
- Various High Courts and Supreme Court of India have maintained
 - aided school T do not hold an office of profit
 - So cannot be held disqualified to contest elections, and
 - Needn't resign from their posts if elected as MLCs or MLAs
- Taking advantage of job security, aided Ts contest elections for LBs, municipalities, town corporations, Legislative Assemblies, Parliament
- Consequently, Aided school T have become politically more active
- T in government schools in UP demanding equal rights

Attempts to abolish guaranteed representation of teachers

- The Chief Election Commissioner of India in 1965 suggested the abolition of teacher constituencies, on the grounds that ‘apart from there being no justification for singling out the teaching profession for special treatment, it seems to me undesirable that teachers should be dragged into party politics in this manner.’
- Matter also considered by Central Government on 7 occasions between 1957 and 1979; no change in status quo
- In early 1990s, Central Advisory Board on Education (CABE) also sought states’ views. Based on these, the CABE committee report stated: “the nature and extent of politicisation of teachers through involvement in elections in the context of the constitutional provision for their representation in Legislative Councils came up for discussion in various aspects. An apprehension was expressed that extending voting rights to elementary (school) teachers would further aggravate the situation. The sufferers would be the children in particular and the elementary education system in general. Such a situation would not be in accordance with the spirit of the provisions of the Constitution.....The Committee, therefore, is of the opinion that there is no need to retain the present provision of separate constituency for teachers in Legislative Councils” (CABE, 1992).
- Its recommendations never carried out
- Special status of teachers continues as is

Implications

- Guaranteed representation has led to substantial political penetration in both upper and lower house

Teacher representation in UP Legislative Council, various years

Year	Total seats	Teacher Members	Ex-teacher members	Total Teachers	Teachers as % of total
1952	72	7	5	12	17
1954	72	7	4	11	15
1956	72	6	4	10	14
1958	108	10	4	14	13
1960	108	12	4	16	15
1962	108	16	2	18	17
1964	108	14	3	17	16
1966	108	10	4	14	13
1968	108	12	2	14	13
1970	108	14	2	16	15
1972	108	14	0	14	13
1974	108	18	1	19	18
1976	108	17	3	20	19
1978	108	14	1	15	14
1980	108	15	0	15	14
1982	108	16	2	18	17
1984	108	19	5	24	22
1986	108	13	0	13	12
1988	108	17	1	18	17
1990	108	15	1	16	15
1992	108	16	4	20	19
1994	108	15	3	18	17
1996	108	16	3	19	18
1998	108	14	0	14	13
2000	100*	17	6	23	23
2002	100	16	7	23	23
2004	100	17	5	22	22
2006	100	15	4	19	19
2008	100	14	4	18	18
Average	103	14	3.23	16.9	16.6

Table 2: Teacher MLAs in Legislative Assembly, various years

Legislative Assembly	Total <u>MLAs</u>	Teacher <u>MLAs</u>	Teacher <u>MLAs</u> as % of total
First Assembly (1952-57)	430	NA	NA
Second Assembly (1957-62)	430	11	2.6
Third Assembly (1962-67)	430	26	6.0
Fourth Assembly (1967-69)	425	21	4.9
Fifth Assembly (1969-74)	425	27	6.4
Sixth Assembly (1974-77)	425	22	5.2
Seventh Assembly (1977-80)	425	23	5.4
Eighth Assembly (1980-84)	425 (421)	39	9.2
Ninth Assembly (1984-89)	425 (422)	30	7.1
Tenth Assembly (1989-91)	425 (422)	27	6.4
Eleventh Assembly (1991-93)	425 (401)	36	8.5
Twelfth Assembly (1993-96)	425 (422)	46	10.8
Thirteenth Assembly (1996-2002)	425	37	8.7
Fourteenth Assembly (2002-07)	404	24	5.9
Average	424	28.4	6.6

Note: Figures in brackets show the actual strength of members.

Source: The table is based on the records as available in the Assembly Library, Lucknow.

**Teachers' participation in politics and connections with politicians,
Uttar Pradesh 2008**

	Primary	Secondary	Total
% who have met or know a teacher MLA			
Govt. schools	6.6	26.3	12.1
Aided schools	--	35.3	35.3
Private schools	6.3	19.8	13.5
Total schools	6.5	27.5	16.9
% who have met or know a teacher MLC			
Govt. schools	4.6	22.7	9.6
Aided schools	--	48.0	48.0
Private schools	6.3	23.3	15.3
Total schools	5.1	32.6	18.6
% saying a teacher contested the last MLA election in their area			
Govt. schools	3.1	6.6	4.0
Aided schools	--	9.8	9.8
Private schools	7.5	12.1	9.9
Total schools	4.3	9.7	7.0
% saying a teacher contested the last MLC election in their area			
Govt. schools	4.1	15.8	7.4
Aided schools	--	32.7	32.7
Private schools	7.6	13.2	10.6
Total schools	5.1	21.3	13.1

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Why teachers maintain such high levels of contact with teacher MLCs / MLAs ?

- Reason – Teacher MLCs / MLAs are effective in helping teachers:
 - Transfers
 - Dispute resolution
 - Cases of suspension
 - Getting ministerial appointments
- This is the logic why teacher candidates for MLA are supported by teachers, and once in office they help teachers, even though elected from general constituency
- However, still teacher MLCs greater help than MLAs

Teacher Unions

- Teacher unions key stakeholders shaping school governance environment
- Different TUs for different teacher groups
 - RSS for govt. secondary school teachers
 - PSS for govt. primary school teachers
 - MSS for aided sec. school teachers
 - VSS for private school teachers
- Influence of unions gauged
 - Partly by % paid up members, active, take union help, voting
 - Partly by success with which unions have lobbied

Teacher union membership, by school level and school-type

	Primary schools	Secondary schools	Total
Self reported union membership status			
Govt. schools	84.7	84.0	84.5
Aided schools	--	85.3	85.3
Private schools	5.1	36.7	21.9
% of teachers in your school who are members of the teacher union			
Govt. schools	83.3	86.7	84.2
Aided schools	--	90.8	90.8
Private schools	10.3	56.6	35.0
% teachers who have ever taken help From their teacher union *			
Govt. schools	30.8	25.0	29.2
Aided schools	--	43.7	43.7
Private schools	15.9	20.9	18.4
% teachers who say the teacher union helps to address the problems they have+			
Govt. schools	76.4	66.7	73.7
Aided schools	--	75.5	75.5
Private schools	5.0	38.5	26.2

% teachers who ever participated in strike/meeting/protest organized by a teacher union				
Govt. schools	62.2	68.4	63.9	
Aided schools	--	76.5	76.5	
Private schools	3.2	20.0	13.7	
Total	47.7	53.4	50.6	
% teachers saying they discuss among themselves to reach agreement who they will vote for in an election and vote en bloc				
Govt. schools	47.2	50.0	48.0	
Aided schools	--	72.5	72.5	
Private schools	10.9	37.7	27.6	
Total	38.3	53.5	46.2	
Of those saying they vote en bloc, % saying their teacher union motivates them to vote en bloc in elections				
Govt. schools	45.2	55.3	48.1	
Aided schools	--	67.6	67.6	
Private schools	0.0	52.5	44.7	
Total	42.0	60.5	53.2	

Implications for teacher accountability

- A number of teacher accountability measures exist in UP, such as
 - school inspections
 - character book
 - teacher transfers
 - provision for suspension
 - withholding the salary increment
- Not effectively implemented – as T use their political connections and union influence to avert disciplinary action
- All politicians woo teachers but *teacher* politicians specially
- Use their considerable influence and ministerial connections etc. to shelter teachers
- What evidence for this claim?
 - Newspaper stories about incidents in which teacher MLCs involved
 - Teacher union magazines

Example 1: DAV college

- DAV College, Kanpur decided to rationalise staff strength due to very lower PTR
- Teachers given the option to continue in other aided colleges as per GOUP rules, but T became adamant not to move
- MSS came to help by organising a *dharna* (on 16 July 2007) at the college premises.
- All leaders, including the MSS President and Secretary raised slogans against the management and GOUP. They succeeded in stalling the implementation of the order (*Santusht*, Aug 07).
- TU leaders and T legislators also influence **macro** accountability structures

Example 2: Intermediate Education Board

- March 2007, GOUP passed an Act re. reconstitution of 'Intermediate Education Board'.
- Amendment provided for nomination of some non-teacher members in 72 member board.
- MSS opposed, wanted only members elected out of the teacher leaders
- GOUP had to withdraw this Act after *Dharna* of the MSS leaders in the Well of the House itself
- Newspapers next morning had banner headlines. E.g.:
- "Govt. Withdraws Bill Passed by Houses" *Hindustan Times*, Lucknow 13.3.07
- "Shiksha Sanshodhan Bill in for Reconsideration", *Times of India* (13.3.07)
- "Vaapas Lena Para Sadan mein Parit Vedheyak", *Rashtriya Sahara* (13.3.07)
- Case of political pressurization - GOUP had to withdraw a duly passed Act

Example 3: MSS forces education minister's hand

- Corruption in secondary school exams is endemic (tables)
- In 2008, the Education Minister commented against T corrupt practices in examinations; proposed a policy of screening teachers at exam halls (Ballia DIOS received death threats)
- MSS organized *dharnas* on 25 Feb. 08 and decided to boycott Board examinations beginning 4 Mar 08. They burnt effigies of the Education Minister in places like Lucknow and Azamgarh
- They were able to force GOUP to announce that enquiries ordered by the Education Minister would be reviewed ('punarvichaar')
- Decided teachers would not be screened before entering the examination halls; then the MSS withdrew its examination boycott call. (*Santusht* , March 2008)

Problem of cheating in secondary exams

Pass rates in examinations by the UP High School Examinations Board

Year	Percentage of exam-takers who passed		
	Regular candidates	Private Candidates	Total
1988	49.6	40.6	46.6
1989	47.6	39.4	44.8
1990	46.4	40.4	44.2
1991	61.2	52.2	57.0
1992	17.3	9.0	14.7
1997	52.4	36.4	47.9
2002	41.5	29.1	40.2
2008	NA	NA	40.1

Examination control/ management

36. In your opinion, how satisfactorily are the board examinations conducted ? **(Circle any one option)**

Fully satisfactory.....	1	Somewhat satisfactory.....	3
Quite satisfactory.....	2	Unsatisfactory	4

37. Have you heard of incidents where students were involved in cheating ?

Never heard.....	1	Commonly heard.....	3
Sometimes heard.....	2	Heard after every exam.....	4

38. Considering the reality of your district, what percentage of students in your district practice cheating in std 10 board examinations percent students

39. What are means by which a high school teacher helps examinee of std. 10 board examination **(Circle all options that apply)**

Passing note slip.....	1	Allowing students to move outside exam. hall....	5
Ignoring cheating	2	Other (express).....	6
Leak out question paper.....	3	Don't Help.....	7
Verbally giving answer.....	4		

40. If a teacher doesn't help in cheating or corruption in the board examination then what are different circumstances he/she faces ? **(Circle three most important options)**

Trouble from students/ parents	1	Pressure from school principal/ management...	5
Pressure from teacher union.....	2	Other (express).....	6
Pressure from education mafia.....	3	Did not face any problem.....	7
Pressure from colleague teachers.....	4		

41. In your opinion, what percentage of high school teachers of this district are involved in the examination related financial corruption ?

Teachers accepting money for providing unfair means during examination..... Percent teachers

Teachers accepting money for favoring students in grading of answer papers Percent teachers

Board examination related corruption in your district, Uttar Pradesh

	Primary school respondents	Secondary school respondents
% of students in your district who cheat in std 10 board examination:		
Govt	27.0	25.6
Aided	---	29.1
Private	30.8	34.4
% of teachers who accept corruption money for providing unfair means during exams:		
Govt	38.7	32.2
Aided	---	22.8
Private	22.4	36.4
% of teachers who accept corruption money for favouring students in grading scripts:		
Govt	36.2	28.6
Aided	---	18.6
Private	20.4	34.5

**In what ways do teachers help students
to cheat in Class 10th board exam?**

	Secondary school respondents		
	Govt.	Aided	Private
Don't help	60.5	32.0	38.5
Passing note slip	3.9	17.5	21.1
Ignoring cheating	23.7	41.7	41.3
Leak out question paper	0.0	4.9	2.8
Verbally giving answer	32.9	60.2	44.0
Allowing pupils out of hall	7.9	7.8	11.9
Other ways	1.3	1.0	2.8

Source: Authors' calculations from RECOUP (2008) data

Note: the columns don't add up to 100 because respondents could mention all the options that applied, i.e. they did not have to choose only one main method of helping.

Qualitative evidence

- National Commission on Teachers (1986) supports notion that environment serves to avert proper use of acc. measures
- Commission ruled that union-backed teachers did not fear adverse repercussions if they are lax in their work
 - “some of the Principals deposing before it (i.e. before the Commission) lamented that they had no powers over teachers and were not in a position to enforce order and discipline. Nor did the District Inspectors of Schools and other officials exercise any authority over them as the erring teachers were often supported by powerful teachers’ associations. We were told that that there was no assessment of a teacher’s academic and other work and that teachers were virtually unaccountable to anybody” (NCT, 1986, p68).

Teacher union stances (and influence) on decentralising reform proposals

Pecuniary benefits of union membership?

- Benefits don't accrue at level of individual teacher
- Strength of collective bargaining – raised pay across the board
- 4 ways of assessing success of TUs in raising pay
 - How T salary expenditure changed over time; compare with changes in non salary education expenditure
 - How T salary increase over time compares with per capita GDP increase over time
 - What is the ratio of T salary to state per capita GDP, and how that has changed over time
 - What is the ratio of govt. school T salary to private school T salary, and how that ratio has changed over time

Table 7
Salary expenditure as a proportion of total expenditure

YEAR	Recurrent as a % of total educational expenditure	Salary as a percentage of total recurrent educational expenditure (%)		
		<u>Primary</u>	<u>Junior</u>	<u>Secondary</u>
1960-61	74.7	87.9	85.1	72.3
1965-66	79.4	90.7	89.2	75.3
1969-70	85.0	92.3	90.4	85.6
1974-75	87.1	96.6	94.3	87.1
1981-82	94.8	96.7	93.8	89.9
1987-88	97.3	NA	NA	90.7

Source: Table 13.13 Kingdon and Muzammil (2003), constructed from (GOI, Education in India), various years. Note: The figures published for the year 1987-88 for primary and junior education levels are not comparable with figures published in previous years because for 1987-88, non-teaching staff salaries have been lumped together with the item 'other' giving the implausibly low figures of 94.0% and 91.6% for primary and junior education respectively. After the late 1980s, the publication of the breakdown of total educational spending into salary, consumables, and other expenditure has been discontinued, i.e. it does not appear to be published any more. For instance, the 1994-95 copy of 'Education in India', published in the year 2000, had no such table. Note that prior to 1960-61, expenditure information in published documents was not presented by item of expenditure (salaries, consumables, others, etc) but rather by expenditure on boys' schools and expenditure on girls' school, etc or expenditure by source.

Table 7: Teachers' nominal and real salaries in UP (Rs. per month)

YEAR	Principal Inter college		Headmaster High School		Assistant Teacher Inter college		Trained Grad Teacher High School		CT Grade Teacher		CPI 1960= 100
	Nom.	Real	Nom.	Real	Nom.	Real	Nom.	Real	Nom.	Real	
1960-61	250	250	225	225	175	175	120	120	75	75	100
1969-70	275	153	247	137	215	119	138	77	100	56	180
1971-72	500	260	400	208	365	190	300	156	220	115	192
1973-74	550	220	450	180	400	160	300	120	250	100	250
1975-76	850	272	770	246	650	208	450	144	450	144	313
1985-86	2200	355	2000	323	1600	258	1400	226	1350	217	620
1995-96*	8000	519	7500	486	6500	422	5500	357	4500	292	1542
2006-07**	20610	797	18750	725	16290	630	14430	558	13500	522	2585
Annual % increase											
1973 - 1996	12.9	4.0	13.6	4.6	13.5	4.5	14.1	5.1	14.0	5.0	
Annual % increase											
1996 - 2006	10.9	4.0	8.7	3.7	8.7	3.7	9.2	4.1	10.5	5.4	

Per capita GDP growth over the 1973 – 1996 period was 3% pa
 From 1st January 2006, teacher salaries have virtually doubled : e.g.
 starting salary of a primary school teacher increased by 115%

Teacher pay, by school type

School level	<u>Kingdon's study 1994</u>	<u>Kansal's study 1990</u>	<u>Govinda/Varghese 1993</u>	<u>Jain's study 1988</u>	<u>Bashir's study 1994</u>	<u>Singh/Sridhar 2002</u>	<u>Murali-dharan, Kremer 2006</u>	<u>Kingdon, Banerji, Chaudhary 2008</u>
	<u>Lucknow district of Uttar Pradesh</u>	City of New Delhi	5 districts of Madhya Pradesh	Baroda district of Gujarat	Many districts of Tamil Nadu	2 districts of Uttar Pradesh	20 states of India	11 districts of Bihar and UP
<i>Primary/junior level</i>	42	39	49	47	47	20	20	8

Note: The Kingdon 1994 study sampled 182 teachers, Kansal 233 teachers, Govinda and Varghese 111 teachers, Bashir 419 teachers, and Singh and Sridhar 467 teachers and Kingdon, Banerji, Chaudhary study 734 teachers. We do not know the number of teachers sampled in Jain or Muralidharan and Kremer.

Source: Table 6.7 in Kingdon (2008), and SchoolTELLS (2008).

Acc to our 2007-08 survey of primary teachers in UP:

private teachers' mean salary - Rs. 940 pm

govt. (regular) teachers' mean salary – Rs. 11850 pm

So, ratio of private/govt pay was 8% (before 6th Pay Comm)

After 6th Pay Commission, ratio likely to be around 4-5%

Teacher salary as a proportion of pc GDP

- Per capita GDP of UP (2005) - Rs. 16473 (annual)
- Govt. primary school teacher salary in 2007 was Rs. 11851 (per month)
- Assuming salary rose 5% per year and deflating back to 2005, Rs. 10749 pm or Rs 128,988 annual.
- Thus, ratio of teacher salary to pc GDP = 7.8 in UP (before 6th Pay Comm)
- In Bihar, monthly teacher pay in 2007 Rs. 11691 deflated to 2005 is Rs. 10604 pm or Rs. 127249 annual.
- Bihar's pc GDP in 2005 - Rs. 9600 annual.
- Thus, ratio of teacher salary to pc GDP = 13.3 in Bihar (before 6th Comm)
- Ratio for Asia = 2.9
- Ratio for countries with pcGDP < \$2000 = 3.7
- for developed countries ratio 1.2 – 1.6

Effects on pupil learning outcomes

- Survey of teachers merged with SchoolTELLS survey – only for sample primary schools
- Tested students of grades 2 and 4
- Achievement levels in language and maths
- Converted into z-scores
- School FE estimator – reduces endogeneity bias

Table 10
Achievement equation, government primary schools only, UP
 (Dependent variable: z-score of achievement mark)

	Ordinary Least Squares			School Fixed Effects		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Class 4	0.240*** (16.55)	0.239*** (16.61)	0.235*** (16.20)	0.285*** (17.15)	0.278*** (16.91)	0.285*** (17.13)
Subject Maths	-0.0560*** (-2.92)	-0.0579*** (-3.01)	-0.0585*** (-3.05)	-0.0664*** (-3.66)	-0.0674*** (-3.71)	-0.0675*** (-3.71)
Wave 2	0.0983*** (14.59)	0.0981*** (14.57)	0.0981*** (14.57)	0.104*** (16.38)	0.103*** (16.31)	0.104*** (16.36)
Child characteristics						
Age	0.0171** (2.02)	0.0171** (2.02)	0.0182** (2.14)	0.0553*** (6.46)	0.0555*** (6.48)	0.0555*** (6.48)
Male	0.127*** (6.56)	0.122*** (6.29)	0.119*** (6.18)	0.147*** (7.75)	0.144*** (7.55)	0.146*** (7.66)
Log weight (kg)	0.654*** (7.32)	0.658*** (7.37)	0.659*** (7.38)	0.495*** (5.81)	0.502*** (5.88)	0.496*** (5.82)
Height (cm)	0.0072*** (4.04)	0.0070*** (3.96)	0.0071*** (3.98)	0.0058*** (3.32)	0.0057*** (3.28)	0.0057*** (3.29)
Recently ill§	-0.0793*** (-4.00)	-0.0765*** (-3.87)	-0.0776*** (-3.92)	-0.0938*** (-4.92)	-0.0926*** (-4.85)	-0.0936*** (-4.91)
Mother education	0.0423*** (10.11)	0.0430*** (10.32)	0.0427*** (10.21)	0.0427*** (10.65)	0.0427*** (10.66)	0.0426*** (10.64)
Ln assets	0.101*** (8.21)	0.103*** (8.32)	0.103*** (8.37)	0.0591*** (4.95)	0.0605*** (5.06)	0.0601*** (5.02)
Teacher characteristics						

Achievement equation, government primary schools only, UP
(Dependent variable: z-score of achievement mark)

	Ordinary Least Squares			School Fixed Effects		
	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Child characteristics						
Teacher characteristics						
Age	0.0095*** (6.08)	0.0094*** (6.05)	0.0084*** (5.30)	0.0118*** (5.73)	0.0108*** (5.58)	0.0117*** (5.67)
Male	-0.110*** (-5.27)	-0.112*** (-5.51)	-0.0913*** (-4.29)	-0.150*** (-4.79)	-0.136*** (-4.71)	-0.150*** (-4.77)
Qualification BA	-0.0057 (-0.24)	-0.0001 (-0.00)	-0.0095 (-0.39)	0.118*** (3.05)	0.0984*** (2.62)	0.120*** (3.08)
Qualification MA	-0.00016 (-0.01)	0.00383 (0.14)	-0.00654 (-0.24)	0.120*** (3.03)	0.115*** (2.98)	0.126*** (3.16)
First division	0.0279 (0.97)	0.0291 (1.02)	0.0229 (0.80)	0.151*** (3.78)	0.147*** (3.69)	0.153*** (3.84)
Para teacher	0.0968** (2.44)	0.0939** (2.38)	0.0614 (1.51)	0.233*** (4.53)	0.212*** (4.33)	0.231*** (4.47)
Governance variables						
Union member	-0.0589** (-2.21)		-0.0550** (-2.06)	-0.106** (-2.37)		-0.0904* (-1.95)
Politically connected		-0.238*** (-3.77)	-0.256*** (-4.03)		-0.142** (-1.99)	-0.101 (-1.36)
<i>N</i>	8185	8185	8185	8185	8185	8185
Adjusted R-square	0.25	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.27
Altonji's estimated bias	0.141	-0.128	---	0.988	0.198	---
Altonji's Ratio	---	1.85	---	---	---	---

Why should TU and PC reduce learning?

- Do TU / PC reduce teacher effort?
- We have several measures of effort
- Regressed each of these on TU & PC
 - Controls for teacher characteristics
 - School FE estimator
 - Not necessarily causal

**The association of 'union membership' and of 'political connectedness' with some teacher effort indicators
(Govt. Primary Schools, Uttar Pradesh): School Fixed Effects Estimates**

Dependent variable	Coeff on union member variable	Coeff on 'met or personally knows teacher MLC/MLA	Coeff on 'met or personally knows teacher MLC
Teacher's absence rate	-0.004 (-0.084)	0.075 (1.23)	0.161** (1.98)
% of T's school time given to teaching	-0.207 (-1.42)	-0.498*** (-2.62)	-0.373 (-1.45)
% of T's school time given to organising prayers/games	0.258* (1.86)	-0.391** (-2.20)	-0.478** (-1.96)
Number of days of non-teaching duties outside school	-2.609 (-0.80)	5.127 (1.22)	5.467 (1.05)
Cites 'social work' as an occupation other than teaching	0.077 (0.81)	0.212** (2.01)	0.452*** (3.02)
Has contested any election [^]	0.057 (0.8)	0.312*** (3.07)	0.286** (2.53)
Has filed a education related court case	-0.068 (-1.28)	-0.114** (-2.01)	-0.139* (-1.65)
Agrees that 'frequently absentee teachers should be paid less'	0.027 (0.21)	-0.139 (-0.92)	-0.591*** (-2.86)

Each regression controls for teacher age, gender, religion, education, and para vs. regular status.

- Coeff on TU and PC could be biased by T unobs characteristics
- Moreover, relative small sample (n=235)
- Results are suggestive

Conclusions

- Not the first time someone has looked at the role of T in school governance
- National Commission on Teachers (1984-86)
- Tried to make a contribution
- Mustered evidence

Conclusions

- T profoundly influenced school governance environment
- Influenced governance through their organisations
- Guaranteed representation has increased influence – one can hardly blame teachers/TUs for using that privilege
- T remarkably active in their unions & (at secondary) well connected to T legislators
- Collective strength
 - raised pay across board; influenced ‘macro’ policy
 - helps avert disciplinary action, shelters from local accountability
- Lobbied hard for
 - centralised salary distribution
 - opposed decentralising reforms
- TU mem’ship and pol. connections associated with lower ach.

- Negative assessment supported by available qualitative info
- National Commission on Teachers (1986) concluded “the most important factor responsible for vitiating the atmosphere in schools, we were told, has been the role of teacher politicians and teachers’ organisations.”
- Report levels the following three criticisms:
 - firstly there is too much *politicisation* in the T organisations;
 - secondly there has been too much *proliferation* of such organisations
 - thirdly teachers’ organisations have not paid enough attention to the intellectual and *professional development* of their members.
- Made the impassioned appeal: “we must draw attention ... to the need to promote actively parents’ organisations all over the country. At present there are hardly any organisations interested in providing good education to their children. We feel that such organisations are desperately needed to promote and safeguard the educational interests of their wards and to counteract the negative and unhealthy political preoccupations of some of the teachers and their organisations”. (NCT, 1986, p71).

- Rudolph (1972) states the matter in an apt way:

“we do not assume, as is often assumed, that there is such a thing as an educational system free of political intervention.... In a democratic society and in educational institutions which receive government funds, there will be political influence... The real questions focus on distinguishing what type of political pressure and politicisation is benign and what not,, whether educational purposes are subsumed by the political system, or whether politics becomes a means for strengthening or redefining educational goals”.

- IIEP study (Khandelwal and Biswal, 2004) surveyed 225 teachers, 17 education administrators and 33 other respondents in UP
- Concludes - one of the “visible factors affecting the development of education” is “a highly politicized teaching force and the resulting low level of accountability”.
- Cites “Political and bureaucratic interventions” and “institutional barriers such as trade unions and teacher unions” as being among factors that are perceived by educational stakeholders to be the main causes of unethical practice in the education sector” in UP.

Policy points

- How might the governance environment be improved?
 1. Constitutional amendment
 - to do away with guaranteed representation
 - Led to culture of political activism, political interference
 2. Apex court recognize aided T as holding office of profit
 - Would depoliticize teachers
 3. Election Commission reduce % teachers in 'polling party'
 - from 50-67% to 25-33%
 - this gives teachers perceived influence over politicians
 4. Follow NCT's advice of 24 years ago – parents' orgs